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Abstract: The republican case for workplace democracy (WD) is presented and defended 
from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firm—
namely, (a) the right to freely exit the firm and (b) workplace regulation. This paper 
shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or 
imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable 
due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then 
shows that WD is necessary, from a republican standpoint, if workers’ interests are to be 
adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are 
finally addressed—(i) that WD is redundant, (ii) that it is unnecessary provided that liti-
gation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and (iii) that it falls short of ensuring 
republican freedom compared to self-employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Great Recession has awakened the interest in workplace democracy 
once again. Even though the call for workplace democracy (henceforth 
“WD”) was a usual battle-cry and a much-researched topic in the 1970s 
and 1980s, since the early 1990s it has attracted little attention from 
workers and scholars alike.1 However, the greater resilience of coopera-
tives to the crisis has strengthened their presence in the world economy, 
arousing interest in this and other forms of WD once again.2 
 The very idea of WD is elusive. It has historically developed into 
many different forms, including cooperatives, workers’ councils, the Is-
raeli kibbutzim, the German co-determination system, or the U.S. Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plan. However, it can be defined across five 
                                                 
 
1See Drew Christie, “Recent Calls for Economic Democracy,” Ethics 95 (1984): 112-
28. 
 
2See Johnston Birchall and Lou Hammond Ketilson, Resilience of the Cooperative 
Business Model in Times of Crisis (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2009); 
Russell Lansbury, “Workplace Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of 
Industrial Relations 51 (2009): 599-616. 
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dimensions of worker control—namely, the degree of control exercised 
over the firm (information, consultation, co-decision, full control), its 
level (task, department, establishment, corporate HQ), its range (strategic 
issues, nonstrategic issues), its form (direct, representative), and its agent 
(permanent workers, all workers). In this paper, the following minimal 
definition is used:3 
 
Workplace democracy: A form of managerial organization in which 
workers have control rights over the management of the firm. 
 
 A number of arguments have been advanced for and against WD. 
Among the former, it has been argued that WD reduces agency loss; that 
it brings about lower unemployment rates; or that it can lead to greater 
political engagement. Among the latter, it has been argued that democrat-
ic firms suffer from serious efficiency failures related to decision-making 
costs, employment rigidities, and the raising of capital; that risk-averse 
workers prefer to diversify their portfolio instead of investing their sav-
ings in a single firm; or that a mandatory WD would trump the right to 
occupational choice.4 
 These and some further arguments need to be addressed if a conclu-
sive case for WD is to be made. The scope of this paper is more limited. 
It draws upon republican political theory as revitalized over the last three 
decades, and considers whether WD is necessary to ensure workers’ 
freedom from arbitrary exercise of managerial authority. Compared to 
other issues such as criminal law, welfare provision, or global justice, 
                                                 
 
3These dimensions are adapted from Mick Marchington and Adrian Wilkinson, “Di-
rect Participation and Involvement,” in Stephen Bach (ed.), Managing Human Resources: 
Personnel Management in Transition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), chap. 15. For a sample 
of notably diverse definitions, see Robert Dahl, (1985) A Preface to Economic Democra-
cy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, 
“A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise,” Economics and Philoso-
phy 9 (1993): 75-100; Nien-hê Hsieh, “Survey Article: Justice in Production,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 72-100. For an exhaustive overview of existing forms of 
WD, see Gregory K. Dow, Governing the Firm: Workers’ Control in Theory and Prac-
tice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
4For recent overviews of the normative debates, see Dow, Governing the Firm, chap. 
2; Hsieh; “Survey Article: Justice in Production”; Axel Gosseries and Grégory Ponthière 
(eds.), “La démocratie d’entreprise,” Revue de philosophie économique 8, no. 2 (2008); 
Iñigo González-Ricoy, “Democratizar la empresa: Un análisis desde la filosofía política,” 
Revista de estudios políticos 148 (2010): 45-69. For attempts to integrate the normative 
debates on WD into a broader political-economic analysis, see David Ellerman, Property 
and Contract in Economics: The Case for Economic Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992); Kevin A. Carson, Organization Theory: A Libertarian Perspective (Charleston, 
S.C.: BookSurge, 2008); Dow, Governing the Firm; David Schweickart, After Capital-
ism, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). 
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contemporary republican theory has left the organization of the work-
place largely unaddressed.5 For example, in his contribution to a sympo-
sium on “The economic implications of republicanism,” Philip Pettit  
focuses on three features of the market (“property, exchange, and regula-
tion”), leaving the workplace virtually unaddressed.6 Given that workers 
spend almost one third of their adult lives in their workplaces, and that 
their jobs dramatically affect their well-being,7 the general neglect of 
labor issues by contemporary political philosophers is certainly surpris-
ing. Yet, as Alex Gourevitch has pointed out, the neglect is the more sur-
prising among contemporary republicans, given that the republican idea 
of freedom historically emerged in opposition to slavery, and that labor 
issues were central to classic republicanism.8 
 The present article aims to fill this gap. It makes a twofold contribu-
tion to the analysis of republican freedom in the workplace. It first as-
sesses the availability of exit rights and workplace regulation as a means 
of ensuring republican freedom in the workplace, and shows that they 
both fall short of doing so. Second, it shows that WD is required to en-
sure this, and compares it to a number of further alternatives, including 
litigation, unionism, and self-employment. The paper is divided into five 
further sections. Section 2 introduces the republican framework used 
throughout the paper. Section 3 shows the forms of arbitrary interference 
that are likely to appear in the firm and the inadequacy of exit rights and 
workplace regulation in addressing them. Section 4 unpacks the republi-
can case for WD. Section 5 addresses three important objections. A con-
clusion closes the paper. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
5Notable exceptions include Antoni Domènech, El eclipse de la fraternidad        
(Barcelona: Crítica, 2004); Nien-hê Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Repub-
licanism,” Social Theory and Practice 31 (2005): 115-42; Christopher McMahon, “The 
Indeterminacy of Republican Policy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005):              
67-93; Alex Gourevitch, “Labor and Republican Liberty,” Constellations 18 (2011):   
431-54. 
 
6Philip Pettit, “Freedom in the Market,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 5 (2006): 
131-49, p. 132. 
 
7For example, in Europe almost as many employees die on average due to fatal inju-
ries in the workplace as citizens die due to intentional homicide (there were 2.5 fatal ac-
cidents per 100,000 persons employed in 2008 and 3.5 intentional homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants in 2011). See, respectively: Eurostat, Europe in Figures: Eurostat Yearbook 
2012 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012), p. 190; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Homicide statistics, at http://www.unodc.org/unodc 
/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html (accessed July 6, 2013). 
 
8Gourevitch, “Labor and Republican Liberty,” p. 431. 
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2. Republicanism 
 
The republican tradition of political thought is concerned with freedom 
as nondomination as its central political value.9 Since the goal of this 
paper is to explore the implications of the republican conception of free-
dom for workplace governance, rather than to provide a defense of such 
a conception, this section is limited to briefly describing its two key ele-
ments, and thus leaves aside a number of important concerns flagged by 
critics.10 (Readers familiar with the republican conception should be able 
to skip this section and go directly to section 3.) 
 To introduce the republican conception of freedom, let us compare it, 
as is customary, to its liberal counterpart. According to the latter, an 
agent is free if and only if she is not interfered with—be it by actions, 
coercive threats, or manipulation—in her choices and actions. Republi-
can authors have stressed two counterintuitive implications that are rele-
vant for present purposes. First, a slave with a benign master may be 
free, to some extent, as long as her master forgoes interfering with her 
choices. Second, any form of interference—and notably of legal interfer-
ence (say, a ban on slavery)—reduces by definition the freedom of the 
agent on whom the interference is visited, however apparently justified 
such interference may be. 
 Republican freedom, by contrast, is defined as nondomination, with 
domination being the capacity to interfere arbitrarily with the choices 
and actions of another agent. The classic instance of unfreedom is slav-
ery, in which the slave lives under the ever-present threat of being      
interfered with arbitrarily, that is, without her master having to track    
the slave’s interests. From a republican standpoint, the capacity of the     
master to interfere arbitrarily diminishes the ability of the slave to define 
and pursue her ends with self-confidence. Since the slave is aware that 
her master enjoys an ever-present position to interfere whenever she   
deviates from her preferences, the choices of the former are likely to con-
form to the preferences of the latter. In short, from a republican stand-
point, the freedom of the slave is diminished not only by the extent to 
                                                 
 
9Full-blown accounts of the republican tradition include: Philip Pettit, Republicanism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Domènech, El eclipse de la fraternidad; 
Frank Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
 
10For such concerns, see: Robert E. Goodin, “Folie républicaine,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 6 2003): 55-76; Matthew Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Ian Carter, “How are Power and Unfreedom Related?” in 
Cécile Laborde and John Maynor (eds.), Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2008), chap. 2. 
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which she is arbitrarily interfered with, but also by the capacity of the 
master to do so, regardless of whether such capacity is eventually exer-
cised or not.11 
 To see this, consider the case of a woman who depends on her hus-
band as her only source of income. Further assume that the latter agrees 
to share his income with her and to make all household decisions on a 
basis of parity. If the husband uses his economic position to impose his 
interests, this will certainly diminish his wife’s freedom. Yet, even if he 
does not, his economic position will also affect the wife’s behavior re-
garding those decisions involving spending. From a republican stand-
point, the wife’s liberty is affected even when she is not actually inter-
fered with. 
 Let us turn now to the second difference between the republican and 
the liberal definitions. Just as unfreedom without interference is possible 
under the former yet not under the latter, so too is interference without 
unfreedom. This is the case when the interference exercised is non-
arbitrary. To see this, consider the following example: 
 
Tanya lives in a small, newly created country in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most im-
portant issue in the region is the treatment of a disenfranchised minority that lives 
throughout the country. Tanya truly dislikes the minority and wants to further damage 
them if she can. While public opinion concerning the minority varies greatly, the gov-
ernment has taken the side of the minority. Consequently, a ban has been placed on any 
action or public speech that is intended to hurt the disenfranchised minority. In other 
words, the government has made laws against hurting the minority, but Tanya wishes she 
could hurt them.12 
 
 Jonathan Phillips presented subjects with this case and asked them if 
they considered that the ban diminished Tanya’s freedom or not. Interest-
ingly, the mean response was closer to “Not at all” than to “Complete-
ly.”13 This finding is consistent with the republican conception of free-
dom (though Phillips analyzes it differently). According to this concep-
tion, interference can occur without substantial loss of liberty when it 
                                                 
 
11Here I take the stand of Skinner rather than of Pettit. The intuitive idea is that the 
slave’s freedom is certainly diminished by the very possibility of her being interfered 
with, as both Skinner and Pettit believe. But, pace Pettit, her freedom is also diminished 
when she is actually interfered with arbitrarily, or when such interference is more likely 
to happen. See Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, and Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republi-
can Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner,” Political Theory 30 
(2002): 339-56. 
 
12Jonathan Phillips, “Freedom: Morality and Folk Intuitions,” p. 14; see link at http:// 
publicreason.net/2009/02/27/ppps-freedom-morality-and-folk-intuitions/. 
 
13The survey covered 67 undergraduate students, and the mean responses were scored 
on a scale from 1 (“Not At All”) to 7 (“Completely”). This case obtained a 3.53. See 
Phillips, “Freedom: Morality and Folk Intuitions,” p. 15. 
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prevents agent A (say, Tanya) from interfering with the choices and ac-
tions of agent B (say, the disenfranchised minority) arbitrarily, that is, 
without being forced to track the interests of B.14 Such interference may 
diminish to some extent A’s freedom, for it thwarts her choices and ac-
tions. Yet it does not do so completely if it forces A to track the interests 
of B and, accordingly, interferes with A’s choices and actions non-
arbitrarily.15 
 The republican tradition has identified nonarbitrary interference with 
the rule of law being in place, that is, with the existence of stable and 
publicly known legal rules, as a means to nonarbitrarily constrain the 
ability of powerful parties to impose their will and to force said parties to 
track the interests of all involved. Of course, legal rules can be arbitrary 
themselves when they are arbitrarily adopted or enacted, as will become 
clear in section 3.2. However, when they are not, they need not trump 
freedom; they rather enable it. Republican freedom is then defined as 
“immunity by the law,” rather than as “immunity from the laws,” as 
James Harrington famously put it.16 
 As we shall see below, this element of republican freedom is crucial 
because it could allow, and indeed require, forms of interference in the 
workplace (resulting, for example, from rules internal to the firm or from 
labor legislation enacted by state agencies) that may not diminish the 
freedom of the managers and workers on whom they are placed. In what 
follows, I turn to the forms of domination that are likely to occur in the 
workplace and to the forms of nonarbitrary interference that may be jus-
tified to address them.  
 
 
3. Republicanism in the Workplace 
 
Put briefly, in the liberal conception a person is free if and only if she is 
not actually interfered with in her choices and actions. By contrast, here 
is the republican conception:  
 
                                                 
 
14Philip Pettit, “Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems,” in Laborde 
and Maynor (eds.), Republicanism and Political Theory, chap. 4, p. 117. 
 
15Such interference does not ensure that the interests of the latter are adequately 
tracked merely because they are taken into account, for if someone is looking for a way 
to hurt someone else (as in the case of Tanya), she might keep track of what her         
victim prefers and systematically attempt to thwart each of her goals. It does ensure     
that such interests are adequately tracked when it forces the interferer (say, Tanya) to  
take the interests of the interferee as having the same normative weight as her own    
interests. 
 
16James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, ed. 
J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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Republican freedom: X is free iff she enjoys immunity against the possi-
bility of being arbitrarily interfered with.  
 
 Now, what forms of arbitrary interference are to appear in the firm? 
And how are they to be addressed from a republican standpoint? In con-
trast to self-employment, the employment relationship consists in the 
voluntary subordination of the worker to the command of the employer 
regarding the material details of the job. Continued interference in the 
form of commands and supervision is, thus, unavoidable. Now, republi-
cans need not worry about this form of interference as long as it is ade-
quately checked, that is, as long as the employer is forced to track the 
interests of the employee. 
 Forced labor and child work are often presented as the most obvious 
instances of workers subject to arbitrary interference.17 Yet arbitrary in-
terference may also take place in uncoerced, yet inadequately checked, 
working environments. Nien-hê  Hsieh lists three levels of decision-
making in which this can occur: (a) decisions directing a worker to per-
form a certain task or to limit her performance, such as favoritism in al-
locating work and overtime or verbal and physical abuse in supervision; 
(b) decisions affecting not the particular actions of the worker but the 
conditions under which such actions are performed, such as capricious 
rescheduling of working hours, discrimination in promotion and com-
pensation, or assignment of hazardous tasks; and (c) decisions that are 
made neither directly about the worker nor about her working conditions, 
but nevertheless affect her as a side effect, such as investment policies, 
production planning, or relocations.18 
 Arbitrary decisions at these three levels can be and are often made by 
employers and managers. Since they occur in the setting in which people 
spend one third of their adult lives and can dramatically affect them and 
their families, they raise a sensible concern. What is to be done about 
them? As we have seen, from a republican standpoint the goal is not to 
reduce the existence of managerial authority, but only its arbitrary exer-
cise. In turn, adequate immunity will be ensured as long as employers, 
directors, and first-line managers are forced to track workers’ interests. 
However, this aim can be achieved in a number of possible ways. Let us 
consider the two main available alternatives in this section and turn to a 
third one—namely, WD—in section 4. 
                                                 
 
17They include violations of two of the fourfold set of fundamental labor rights in-
cluded in the ILO’s 1998 “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,” 
the major international consensus document on the issue. 
 
18Hsieh, “Survey Article: Justice in Production,” p. 122, and “Rawlsian Justice and 
Workplace Republicanism,” p. 91. 
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3.1. Exit rights 
 
A first response to potential arbitrary interference in the workplace is that 
in free labor markets employees can always quit their job if they are 
treated capriciously. As Richard Arneson puts it,  
 
the freedom of the individual on a modern labor market willy-nilly confers on each per-
son a considerable degree of control in the form of exit rights ... One can generally es-
cape the reach of ... unwanted policies by quitting one’s job and taking another.19 
 
 Employers are aware of this. Accordingly, they have a strong incen-
tive to track the interests of their employees and behave nonarbitrarily. 
Consider two versions of this response—a strong version and a weaker 
one.  
 According to the strong version, little is to be done apart from ensur-
ing that markets remain competitive and workers can freely exit their 
jobs. Arbitrary interference could have been the norm under the British 
Master and Servant Acts, when employees could be prosecuted for quit-
ting their jobs. And it is so nowadays in markets of prostitution and 
forced labor, in monopsonistic labor markets, or in cases in which illegal 
immigrants work under the threat of being reported and repatriated.   
These are all instances of compulsory or quasi-compulsory labor, in 
which workers can be arbitrarily interfered with. However, this need not 
be the case in free, competitive, and full-clearing labor markets. In these 
markets, workers use their right to quit as an implicit, yet ever-present, 
threat against ex post managerial decisions—that is, decisions not con-
tractually specified at the outset of the relationship—that could lead to 
arbitrary interference. 
 The weak version, by contrast, assumes that power asymmetries     
can arise in free labor markets. And it argues in favor of making exit as 
costless as possible by modifying the background conditions under 
which the employment relationship takes place. Measures such as the 
state provision of unemployment benefits, public health care, or a univer-
sal basic income, in addition to further and more radical measures that 
may modify the whole structure within which firms operate, could alter 
such conditions and reduce exit costs, thus balancing power asymmetries 
between employers and employees.20 According to Brian Barry, for ex-
ample, a basic income “is the most practicable (perhaps the only practi-
                                                 
 
19Richard Arneson, “Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels,” in David 
Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (eds.), The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 3, p. 139. 
 
20I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to expand this version of 
the argument. 
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cable) way of counteracting the excessive power of employers over 
workers.”21 
 Let us now assess the ability of exit rights to ensure that employers 
and managers adequately track workers’ interests. To be sure, exit rights 
are necessary for doing so, yet they turn out to be insufficient, at least, 
for three reasons.  
 First, imperfect labor markets do have involuntary unemployment. 
This, in turn, has disciplinary effects over employed workers by making 
it costly for them to quit (since they would not be in a position to find 
another job easily). Further, Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz show that 
under conditions of imperfect information, involuntary unemployment 
also obtains in perfectly competitive markets, which need a sufficiently 
large unemployment rate to remain competitive.22 It is thus mistaken to 
say, as the strong version of the exit rights argument does, that employ-
ees can use the right to quit as a credible threat against arbitrary interfer-
ence. Further, since unemployment has consequences for the self-esteem 
of unemployed workers, this problem also affects the weak version of the 
argument. Even under background conditions that may dramatically im-
prove their bargaining position, unemployment is likely to serve as a dis-
ciplinary device. As a result, employers are likely to remain unforced to 
adequately track the interests of their employees and are eo ipso likely to 
be able to act arbitrarily, at least to some extent. 
 Second, even if labor markets cleared, there are additional exit costs 
that can lock in employees.23 Four stand out: (i) sunk costs incurred by 
workers in developing firm-specific human capital (the so-called too-
much-invested-to-quit effect); (ii) workers’ integration in the network of 
coworkers, customers, and so on, that a job provides, and that may be-
come a central part of their lives; (iii) searching and transition costs from 
one job to another; and (iv) psychological costs of quitting work alto-
gether—work being a relevant source of self-respect.24 Again, since these 
costs are likely to apply under the conditions specified by both the strong 
                                                 
 
21Brian Barry, Why Social Justice Matters. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 212. 
 
22Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz, “Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,” 
American Economic Review 74 (1984): 433-44. 
 
23Jon Elster and Karl Ove Moene, “Introduction,” in Jon Elster and Karl Ove    
Moene (eds.), Alternatives to Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 6; Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), p. 71. Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism,” 
pp. 129 ff. 
 
24On normative issues related to work and self-esteem, see: Adina Schwartz, “Mean-
ingful Work,” Ethics 92 1982): 634-46; Richard Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market 
Socialism,” Ethics 97 (1987): 517-45; Jeffrey Moriarty, “Rawls, Self-Respect, and the 
Opportunity for Meaningful Work,” Social Theory and Practice 35 (2009): 441-59. 
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and the weak argument, it turns out that none of them is likely to provide 
a sufficient check on employers’ ability to arbitrarily interfere with the 
choices and actions of their employees. 
 Third, even if exit were costless, job alternatives for workers may be 
as despotic, unregulated, and arbitrary as their current job. For example, 
if gender discrimination is pervasive across the economy, then being able 
to costlessly quit may be of little value for women, and background eco-
nomic justice may not be able to adequately address the problem. As an 
analogy, consider an archipelago of countries that were ruled by dictators 
who, nevertheless, enforced an open borders policy. Would their power 
become any less arbitrary just because citizens could costlessly exit their 
countries and enter a country that is equally dictatorial?25 Adam Mich-
nick, the Polish democratic dissident, was once presented with a similar 
counterfactual, to which he replied with the following:  
 
If forced to choose between General Jaruzelski and General Pinochet, I would choose 
Marlene Dietrich. The alternative is absurd and irrational. It offers me the choice, as I 
fight for democracy in a dictatorial system, of sitting in prison either as a Communist or 
as an anti-Communist.26  
 
 Caveat: while these three reasons show that, although probably neces-
sary, exit rights alone may not be sufficient to prevent arbitrary interfer-
ence, they may apply very differently within and across firms, as well as 
across time and place. For example, while an experienced surgeon in 
Rotterdam may be able to find a similar job just by walking across the 
street, an unskilled worker in bankrupt Detroit may find it very difficult 
to do so. In short, employers may have an uneven capacity to interfere 
arbitrarily with the various subsets of employees under different circum-
stances. Now, even though employees who possess scarce and valued 
skills may be de facto immune to arbitrary interference, employees who 
lack such skills are not, as Robert Dahl points out.27 Hence, additional 
means to exit rights may not be necessary for the former, just as Warren 
Buffet may not need voting rights to have de facto political influence. 
Yet, they may be necessary for the latter. 
 
 
                                                 
 
25I owe this example to Axel Gosseries. A similar case can be found in Philip Pettit, 
“Law and Liberty,” in Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (eds.), Legal Republican-
ism: National and International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
chap. 1, p. 52. 
 
26Quoted in Alexander S. Kirshner, “Proceduralism and Popular Threats to Democra-
cy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 405-24, p. 411. 
 
27Robert Dahl, “A Right to Workplace Democracy? Response to Robert Mayer,” The 
Review of Politics 63 (2001): 249-53, p. 252. 
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3.2. Workplace constitutionalism 
 
As we have just seen, some authors argue that WD is unnecessary be-
cause exit rights are enough to protect employees from arbitrary interfer-
ence. Similarly, some authors argue that WD is unnecessary because 
workplace regulation provides a sufficient check on the exercise of man-
agerial authority—call this option workplace constitutionalism (hence-
forth “WC”). Some neo-republicans embrace this position. Richard Dag-
ger, for instance, considers that republican policies would require a re-
gime that “constrains the discretion of managerial decision-making.” 
However, he argues, it “will not get so far as to require workplace de-
mocracy, in which workers participate directly in the governance of the 
firm.”28 
 WC proposes the sort of regulation that we currently find, somehow 
or another, in our advanced economies in the form of international labor 
standards, workers’ constitutional rights, and professional and craft 
standards. As we have seen in section 2, republican freedom requires the 
existence of stable and publicly known legal rules that constrain the abil-
ity of powerful parties to arbitrarily impose their will. As a result, such 
regulations are justified, and indeed required, from a republican stand-
point insofar as they reduce managerial discretion and, accordingly, 
managers’ ability to make arbitrary decisions, including sexual harass-
ment, racial discrimination in compensation and promotion, or assign-
ment of hazardous and humiliating tasks. 
 Unlike the exit rights argument, WC is not aimed at establishing the 
right of employees to costlessly quit, so they can use it as an implicit 
threat in their daily relation with managers. Rather, it attempts to set 
clear and specific standards to which managers have to conform in the 
exercise of their authority, in order to reduce their discretion. This ap-
pears to be a better means to prevent arbitrariness since, as Randy 
Hodson demonstrates, the likelihood of arbitrary interference is much 
lower when command and/or supervision is indirect and standardized 
(e.g., through bureaucratic rules or craft and professional criteria), rather 
than direct and personal.29 
 Under WC, the authority of employees and managers is not ruled out. 
They still have ample margin to run the firm as they deem appropriate. 
Yet, they have to conform to a number of rules that reduce their discre-
tion in the exercise of their authority and, accordingly, the possibility of 
                                                 
 
28Richard Dagger, “Neo-Republicanism and the Civic Economy,” Politics, Philoso-
phy & Economics 5 (2006): 151-73, p. 162. 
 
29Randy Hodson, Dignity at Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
p. 88. 
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arbitrariness. For example, employers and managers can of course decide 
whether employee A will transport some merchandise to either Philadel-
phia or Pittsburgh, or whether employee B rather than employee C will 
be promoted. But they cannot require employee A to drive above the 
number of hours permitted by the health and safety regulation statute, 
just as they cannot violate the anti-discrimination law in promoting em-
ployee B rather than C. 
 To be sure, discretion need not amount to arbitrariness. Employers 
can certainly behave responsibly and be responsive to the interests of 
their employees. However, as we have seen in section 2, republicanism is 
not only concerned with actual arbitrariness, but also with its possibility. 
Now, since WC appears to provide immunity from both actual and pos-
sible arbitrariness, it might seem that WC is sufficient to ensure republi-
can freedom in the workplace. However, a number of problems regarding 
WC arise. These are analyzed in detail in the next section. For now, and 
in order to introduce such reasons, consider the following counterintui-
tive implication of WC. 
 Assume that legal protections alone could ensure immunity from arbi-
trary interference within the firm, and consider next the political sphere. 
If that were the case, why should we have a quarrel with nonparlia-
mentary constitutional monarchy à la Bismarck? In such a regime, citi-
zens’ rights are entrenched in a constitutional text that constrains the au-
thority of the king. Yet, they are disenfranchised, or the parliament lacks 
meaningful legislative force. Now, that is the situation we have nowa-
days in most firms, and the one WC recommends—a situation in which 
workers enjoy both civil rights (e.g., they cannot be discriminated on 
grounds of religion, race, or gender) and social rights (e.g., they enjoy 
paid holidays or a minimum wage), but lack the right to have a say in 
managerial decisions. In most firms, shareholders and their managers 
thus act as nondemocratic constitutional kings. 
 The next section will discuss the reasons why democracy, and not 
only constitutionalism, is as much needed in the firm as in the political 
sphere. Before turning to those reasons, though, let me briefly address a 
methodological concern related to the analogy between constitutional 
monarchy and WC used here, and between the right to exit the state and 
the right to exit the firm used in section 3.1, in the example of the archi-
pelago of dictatorships. 
 Despite its extensive use, the analogy between firms and states—the 
so-called “parallel case argument”—has not gone without controversy.30 
                                                 
 
30The label comes from Joshua Cohen, “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democ-
racy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 6, no. 2 (1989): 25-50. The argument can be found 
in: Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: 
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The main criticism is that firms and states are too different for the analo-
gy between them to hold. It has been argued that firms are voluntary as-
sociations while states are not, that firms are for-profit while states are 
not, that firms are meritocratic while states are not, and that managers 
have power over employees but not Herrschaft, as public officials do. 
Certainly, if we consider these differences, the analogy may not apply. 
However, it may apply if we isolate one variable, namely, the existence 
of arbitrary interference in the absence of adequate checks in both do-
mains. And that may be enough for present purposes, given that the goal 
of this paper is only to assess how the workplace should be organized if 
our goal were only to eliminate arbitrary interference in the firm. Now, 
we should bear in mind that this methodological decision implies that 
until properly balanced against the rest of the relevant variables, any 
conclusion reached under these conditions will only provide a pro tanto 
reason for WD.31 
 
 
4. Workplace Democracy 
 
Republican freedom is not an all-or-nothing matter, and workplace regu-
lation, as much as the right to exit, are likely to be necessary to ensure it 
in the workplace. The goal of this section is to show that they are, none-
theless, insufficient to ensure such freedom in the workplace. It proceeds 
by showing the deficiencies of WC and how WD may address them. Let 
us begin by introducing the following requirement of republican free-
dom: 
 
Political participation: X enjoys immunity against arbitrary interference 
only if she is granted and regularly exercises a set of political rights that 
allow her to influence and contest the decisions affecting her.  
 
 Contrary to what some contemporary commentators have written, in 
the republican tradition, political participation is not considered a neces-
sary condition of freedom as nondomination merely because it is intrinsi-
cally valuable.32 Rather, the main reason for this requirement is that im-
                                                                                                             
Basic Books, 1977); Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy; and Kory P. Schaff, 
“Democratic Rights in the Workplace,” Inquiry 55 (2012): 386-404. For a detailed de-
fense, see Iñigo González-Ricoy, “Firms, States, and Democracy: A Qualified Defense of 
the Parallel Case,” LEAP—Law, Ethics & Philosophy, forthcoming (2014). For a cri-
tique, see Claudio López-Guerra, “Against the Parallel Case for Workplace Democracy,” 
Revue de philosophie économique 8 (2008): 11-28. 
 
31I thank Geneviève Rousselière for pressing me to clarify this point. 
 
32As Skinner recalls with reference to classic republicanism, “the writers I am con-
sidering never suggest that there are certain specific goals we need to realise in order to 
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munity against arbitrary interference can only be ensured when stable 
and publicly known nonarbitrary legal rules are in place. Participation in 
the law-making process by those against whom the law is enforced is 
thus necessary—among other means, such as the separation of powers—
to prevent the law from becoming arbitrary.33 
 This is so for two reasons. First, only political participation can en-
sure that all citizens’ interests are equally considered in the legislative 
process. Second, active participation is required not only at the outset of 
the legislative process, but also at the enactment stage. Even if the first 
condition were satisfied through citizens’ consent to, say, a constitutional 
text, its content would have to be applied to particular and unforeseeable 
cases. This is why active and permanent participation of the citizenry is 
needed both at the law-making and enactment stages. As John Rawls 
thoughtfully argued,  
 
[u]nless there is widespread participation in democratic politics by a vigorous and in-
formed citizen body ... even the best-designed political institutions will eventually fall 
into the hands of those who hunger for power and military glory or pursue narrow class 
and economic interests ... If we are to remain free and equal, we cannot afford a general 
retreat into private life.34 
 
 These two reasons apply similarly to the elaboration and enforcement 
of workplace regulation. According to the first reason, employees ought 
to take part in the elaboration of workplace regulation. Otherwise, such 
regulation is likely to become arbitrary. Consider the case of guest work-
ers who lack political rights in their host countries. For example, Filipina 
domestic workers have to sign a two-year contract to migrate to Hong 
Kong. Further, they are also required to leave the country within two 
weeks after being fired, and they cannot sign another contract if they 
quit. As Hodson argues, these legal requirements are among the major 
reasons why Filipina maids accept constant abuses.35 
 An adequate protection against the possibility of arbitrary interference 
requires workplace regulation. However, such regulation can be arbitrary 
itself. This is likely to be the case unless those against whom it is en-
forced enjoy and exercise the right to influence its drafting, as the case of 
                                                                                                             
count as being fully or truly in possession of our liberty.” “[They] merely argue that par-
ticipation … constitutes a necessary condition of maintaining individual liberty.” Quentin 
Skinner, “The Paradoxes of Political Liberty,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1986), pp. 227-50, at p. 240; Liberty Before 
Liberalism, pp. 74-75 n. 38. 
 
33See Pettit, “Law and Liberty,” pp. 53 ff. 
 
34John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 141. 
 
35See Hodson, Dignity at Work, pp. 96-97. 
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the Filipina maids shows. In short, there is a clear republican case not 
only for workplace regulation, but also for workers’ rights to participate 
in its elaboration. 
 It could be argued that this reason justifies democracy at the constitu-
tion-making stage and in the political realm, but not in the workplace. A 
possible reply is that it may also provide an indirect justification of WD 
due to the side effects that this may have in terms of increasing citizens’ 
engagement in the political realm, as Carole Pateman and Ronald Mason 
have famously championed.36 According to the so-called “spillover the-
sis,” workers’ participation in the workplace can improve their participa-
tion in politics beyond the workplace. However, as recently noted by 
Neil Carter, the existing evidence on the relationship between WD and 
political participation is far from conclusive. For example, a study car-
ried out by Edward Greenberg et al. using a sample of 1,247 workers of 
democratic and nondemocratic companies shows that the relationship is 
much weaker than the one advanced by Pateman and Mason.37 
 Consider now the second, more promising, reason, according to 
which active and permanent participation is required in order to prevent 
the arbitrary enforcement of the existing legislation. Arbitrary interfer-
ence can be anticipated, and thus prevented, to some extent at the outset 
of the employment relationship. However, employment contracts, as 
much as workplace regulations, are unavoidably incomplete. As Oliver 
Hart puts it regarding the parties to the contract, they cannot specify 
“precisely what each of their obligations is in every conceivable state of 
the world.”38 
 Two relevant implications follow. First, it would be impossible, or 
prohibitively costly, for the parties to the agreement to make their con-
tract complete—much more so in large firms and complex and often un-
predictable economic environments. Second, even if it were possible, 
some flexibility is desirable to adequately address day-to-day unforesee-
able contingencies. For these two reasons, the parties do not try to specify 
ex ante all possible contingencies. Rather, the employee agrees to subor-
dinate to the authority of the employer and, even though their relation-
                                                 
 
36See Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970); Ronald Mason, Participatory and Workplace Democracy (Car-
bondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982). 
 
37See Neil Carter, “Political Participation and the Workplace: The Spillover Thesis 
Revisited,” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 8 (2006): 410-26; 
Edward Greenberg, Leon Grunberg, and Kelly Daniel, “Industrial Work and Political 
Participation: Beyond ‘Simple Spillover’,” Political Research Quarterly 49 (1996): 287-
304. 
 
38Oliver D. Hart, “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 4 (1988): 119-39, p. 121. 
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ship is subject to an ongoing process of negotiation that may alter its 
terms, the employer retains residual decision-making rights, that is, the 
final say over decisions that have not been specified at the outset of the 
relationship. However, the fact that employers are granted residual rights 
raises a sensible concern from the republican standpoint—namely, the 
possibility of arbitrary decisions resulting from the exercise of such 
rights.  
 Let us turn now to WD. As we have seen, WC attempts to reduce  
arbitrary interference by means of ex ante regulating employers’ discre-
tion. However, comprehensive regulation is neither possible nor desira-
ble given the very nature of the employment contract in large firms and 
complex economies. WD, by contrast, does not attempt to constrain 
managerial discretion.39 Rather, it is only aimed at reducing the arbi-
trary exercise of such discretion by means of incorporating the interests 
of workers (i.e., those against whom firms’ decisions are enforced)     
into the decision-making process internal to the firm. It does so by grant-
ing workers a binding say both over the firm’s decisions and their       
enforcement. In so doing, WD not only ensures that workers govern 
themselves—something that that they could be said to do indirectly    
insofar as their elected representatives participate in the drafting of      
the labor legislation. It also ensures that they continue to do so across      
a range of nonactual circumstances that cannot be advanced by such   
legislation.40 
 Two important remarks are in order. First, alternative participatory 
means, such as those advanced by “best practice” human resources man-
agement, may also provide workers with a say at some levels and regard-
ing some tasks of firms’ decisions. These may include semi-autonomous 
teams, problem-solving groups, or even joint consultative committees. 
Depending on their scope, level, and form, they may provide incipient 
forms of WD. However, two crucial issues should be kept in mind—    
(i) whether these means are regarded as rights or as prerogatives, and   
(ii) whether their outcomes are regarded as binding on managers or as 
merely advisory. When these measures are in place as actionable rights 
and their outcomes are binding on managers, then they may be close to 
                                                 
 
39This does not mean, of course, that decisions in democratic firms should not be 
constrained by the legal framework within which they operate. For example, from a re-
publican standpoint, workers of a cooperative should not be able to decide democratically 
to lower the salary of some members of the cooperative below the legal minimum wage, 
or to deny membership on the basis of racial or gender discrimination. More on this in 
section 5.1. 
 
40For this requirement, see Nicholas Southwood, “Democracy as a Modally Demand-
ing Value,” Noûs, published online 15 April 2013, DOI: 10.1111/nous.1. 
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WD, and be effective in ensuring that managers track workers’ interests 
adequately. 
 Also note that the reason to grant workers a binding say is not neces-
sarily that there are conflicting interests that need to be balanced. In the 
presence of information asymmetries, participation would still be neces-
sary to track workers’ knowledge and expertise even if such conflicts did 
not arise. In firms in which division of labor and expertise is pervasive, 
workers inevitably retain knowledge both about their interests and about 
how to improve their tasks and the overall functioning of the firm. Alter-
native devices to binding control rights (e.g., surveys, suggestion 
schemes, quality circles) are often used to track this knowledge. How-
ever, as theorists of descriptive representation often point out, those who 
are in a position to make decisions tend to understate this asymmetry and 
take for granted the interests and beliefs of those against whom decisions 
are enforced. A binding say in the decision-making process of the firm 
corrects this bias by forcing directors and managers to take workers’ in-
terests and beliefs into account. 
 
 
5. Objections 
 
So far I have argued that both exit rights and WC fall short of ensuring 
workers’ republican freedom, and that WD is also necessary to ensure it. 
In order to clarify my argument and to adequately address its limitations, 
consider three objections—namely, that WD is redundant, that it goes too 
far provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar goals, and 
that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-
employment. 
 
5.1. Redundancy 
 
It might be objected that WD adds little to WC. In the latter, workers 
already enjoy ample control rights at the political level, and have a say in 
the elaboration and enforcement of workplace regulation.41 Consider 
three responses to this concern. 
 First, even if this is the case, a difference of scope between WC and 
WD still holds. As an analogy, consider the difference between demo-
cratic rights at the state and municipal levels. It seems obvious that      
enjoying democratic rights at the state level is not a sufficient reason     
to prevent citizens from enjoying such rights at the municipal level too, 
given that decisions that affect them are also made at the latter level.  
                                                 
 
41I thank Richard Bellamy and an audience in London for raising this issue. 
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Mutatis mutandis, workers may well enjoy democratic rights at the     
political level, but that does not make democratic rights within the     
firm any less relevant.  
 Second, given that people spend most of their daytime in the work-
place, it is unreasonable to think that participation in the political sphere 
can replace participation in the workplace. Further, participation may be 
more effective in the workplace than in the political sphere, being that 
the impact of each vote, ideally, is 1/n (where n = the number of partici-
pants in the decision, and with n being much larger in the political sphere 
than in the workplace). 
 Third, WD is a form of managerial organization that can, of course, 
be arbitrary, or arbitrarily enforced. For example, a majority of workers 
in a cooperative can use their voting rights to dismiss a minority, thus 
increasing their per capita revenue, or to hire nonmember employees 
above the maximum permitted working hours. This is why there are  
good republican reasons for a multilevel form of WD, in which deci-
sions internal to the firm are constrained by decisions made at the       
sector, state, and international levels. From a republican standpoint,    
WC has to be complemented by WD as much as WD has to be con-
strained by WC. 
 
5.2. Litigation and unionism 
 
It might be further objected, on more pragmatic grounds, that litigation 
and strong unionism could better ensure that workers’ interests are right-
ly tracked.42 This is a complex and empirical issue that cannot be conclu-
sively addressed independently of the background on which firms, 
courts, and unions operate. The proper balance between WD, litigation, 
and unionism is inevitably context-dependent. However, a tentative    
response may be advanced. 
 Consider litigation first. Even though litigation is an essential re-
source of last resort to address violations of workers’ rights and collec-
tive agreements, it presents at least three difficulties. First, it addresses 
workers’ concerns ex post rather than incorporating them into the       
decision-making procedure internal to the firm. Of course, the very    
prospect of litigation creates strong incentives for managers to observe 
the existing labor legislation ex ante. Yet it does not force them to track 
the interests of workers, since, as we have already seen, the law need not 
track the interests of workers unless they have a binding say over the 
law-making process at all or most levels. Second, litigation is carried out 
before courts, which, unlike boards in democratic firms, are not elected 
                                                 
 
42I thank Daniel Attas and Volkan Gul for raising this issue. 
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by workers and thus have a weaker incentive to track their interests ade-
quately. Finally, reliance on legal means for the protection of workers’ 
rights may be prohibitively costly, which may discourage workers from 
bringing suit against their employers. Employers, in turn, may discount 
this behavior. 
 As for trade unionism, even though trade-offs with WD can certainly 
arise,43 this tension is largely apparent. They are, in fact, mutually re-
quired in two senses. 
 On the one hand, unionism turns out to be insufficient to adequately 
address arbitrary interference in the workplace for two main reasons. 
First, in the absence of a formal and binding voice mechanism internal  
to the firm, unions do not ensure that workers’ interests will be ade-  
quately tracked, as WD does. Accordingly, the influence of unions de-
pends on their de facto and variable power. As an analogy, consider     
the disenfranchised members of a polity, who may well organize to    
lobby MPs and influence the law-making process. However, they are 
disadvantaged in relation to the enfranchised population, who enjoy      
de iure and permanent means to elect MPs (in addition to their ability    
to lobby them). Second, unions have a strong incentive to act in favor    
of their affiliated members at the expense of non-union members, while 
WD distributes control rights equally and on a one-worker-one-vote   
basis. 
 On the other hand, in the absence of strong and well-functioning un-
ions (as is nowadays the case in most Western countries, at least in those 
without the Ghent system), WD may be ineffective in adequately track-
ing workers’ interests. This problem is especially pressing in large dem-
ocratic firms, in which time-consuming decisions have to be made about 
complex issues, such as investment policies, production engineering, or 
budgetary planning. In such cases, without the presence of well-equipped 
unions, formal control rights may be of little value. As LAB, one of the 
largest trade unions of the Basque Country, put it in 1992 regarding the 
Mondragón cooperatives: 
 
The absence of syndicates in the cooperatives has negative repercussions for workers. 
Workers lack an organizational form, and the directors of the cooperatives take advantage 
of this fact by making substantial changes in working conditions (increasing work pace, 
changing schedules, abusing temporary contracts, etc.) which would not so easily be 
accepted by workers in private firms.44 
 
                                                 
 
43See Karl Ove Moene,“Strong Unions or Worker Control?” in Elster and Moene 
(eds.), Alternatives to Capitalism, chap. 5. 
 
44Quoted in Sharryn Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragón (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), p. 190. 
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5.3. Self-employment 
 
Finally, it might be objected that WD falls short of ruling out arbitrary 
interference in the workplace compared to self-employment. Given that 
democracy (in the workplace and elsewhere) cannot fully eliminate dom-
ination, the best means to ensure freedom from arbitrary interference 
would consist of uprooting the very source of domination in the work-
place—namely, the existence of managerial authority. 
 This is a very sensible concern.45 Consider two plausible ways of ad-
dressing it. A first response—yet, as we shall see, not a completely con-
vincing one—consists in saying that there is a crucial difference between 
self-employment and the three alternatives discussed in this paper, and 
that the former is beyond the scope of this article because of this differ-
ence. According to this argument, WD, exit rights, and WC advance dif-
ferent forms of reducing the arbitrary exercise of managerial authority. 
Self-employment, by contrast, rules out managerial authority in the first 
place. Put differently, while the former three alternatives provide an an-
swer to the question of how managerial authority should be exercised, 
self-employment provides an alternative to managerial authority alto-
gether.  
 In order to see the plausibility of this response, consider domination 
within the family as an analogy. The abolition of the family would surely 
avoid the problem of arbitrary interference in this sphere. However, ac-
cording to this response, this would only raise the normatively important 
and unavoidable question of how the family ought to be organized in 
order to minimize domination where families do exist. Given that domi-
nation is by definition a relational phenomenon, the issue of how to or-
ganize social relations and the issue of whether this or that precise social 
relationship should be allowed in the first place are conceptually differ-
ent and nonreducible to each other. 
 However, this response is not completely convincing, since the fol-
lowing reply can be advanced. If our goal is to reduce arbitrary interfer-
ence in the workplace, then there is no reason why we should accept the 
exercise of managerial authority in the first place, given that domination 
cannot be completely ruled out where such authority is exercised. Simi-
larly, self-employment should not be discarded, given that it is a form of 
labor in which managerial authority is not exercised and, accordingly, 
arbitrary interference is absent by definition.  
 Of course, it might be further replied that self-employment is not       
a realistic alternative to fully address the issue of domination in the 
workplace in our advanced economies. However, two problems arise 
                                                 
 
45I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. 
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with this reply. First, as a matter of fact, self-employment proves to be    
a more feasible alternative than WD. For example, self-employment      
in OECD countries accounted for 16.8 percent of total employment       
in 2005.46 Even though there is no reliable source with aggregated      
data, democratically run firms are much more marginal. In France, for  
example, jobs provided by cooperatives amounted to only 3.5 percent    
of total employment in 2010.47 Second, and more importantly for present 
purposes, if self-employment is to be assessed—and discarded—on     
the basis of variables other than the reduction of domination in the   
workplace (e.g., its economic effects, its stability, its feasibility), then 
WD should also be assessed according to these variables. However,     
the scope of this paper has been limited from the outset to the protection 
of republican freedom in the workplace, other things being equal.       
Accordingly, discarding self-employment for reasons of feasibility would 
be arbitrary. 
 Consider now a second, more plausible, response. It consists in admit-
ting that if our goal is to reduce arbitrary interference in the workplace, 
then republicanism should ideally recommend an economy based on self-
employment and WD only as a second best alternative. This response is, 
in fact, more consistent with the history of republican thought. Few of us 
would nowadays see employment as a relationship of domination by def-
inition, including many neo-republicans.48 Yet, classic republicans con-
sidered wage labor as unfree labor almost as a matter of definition. They 
defined self-employed workers as sui iuris, as self-standing independent 
workers, and they compared them to salaried workers, who were defined 
as alieni iuris, as dependent on their employers and destined to be domi-
nated by them. For example, Cicero defined the wage received by manu-
al laborers as “a pledge of their slavery.”49 Similarly, in defining who 
should be enfranchised, Kant clearly distinguished between self-
employed and employed workers (and contended that only the latter 
should be granted citizenship): “In cases where [a citizen] must earn his 
                                                 
 
46Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Factbook  
2011-2012: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics (OECD Publishing, 2012),   
p. 161. 
 
47International Cooperative Aliance, “Cooperatives Facts & Figures” (2013), http:// 
ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-facts-figures (accessed March 17, 2013). 
 
48Two exceptions include David Ellerman (2005) “Translatio versus Concessio: Re-
trieving the Debate About Contracts of Alienation with an Application to Today’s 
Employement Contract,” Politics and Society 33(3): 449-480. Carole Pateman (2002) 
“Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale of two Con-
cepts,” Journal of Political Philosophy 10(1): 20-53. 
 
49Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Oficiis, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1913), p. XLII. 
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living from others, he must earn it only by selling that which is his, and 
not by allowing others to make use of him.”50 
 In short, it might be argued that self-employment is not only a better 
means to rule out domination in the workplace, compared to WD, but 
also a more consistent one from the standpoint of classic republicanism.  
However, this response need not be at odds with the first response.  
 On the one hand, it is certainly plausible to argue that if the elimina-
tion of domination is our only goal, then ruling out managerial authority, 
as self-employment does, turns out to be preferable to WD, WC, and exit 
rights. On the other hand, however, it is equally plausible to argue that 
the latter three alternatives address an issue that is conceptually different 
from the one addressed by self-employment. While self-employment ad-
dresses the issue of whether managerial authority should be exercised in 
the first place, WD (as well as WC and exit rights) addresses the issue of 
how managerial authority should be exercised where managerial authori-
ty does exist. Given that the goal of republicanism is not to rule out inter-
ference—but rather to ensure that where interference takes place it is not 
arbitrarily exercised—the distinction remains important. Hence, republi-
canism might ideally recommend ruling out the exercise of managerial 
authority in the first place. Yet, in those cases in which managerial au-
thority is exercised, WD turns out to be the best means to reduce its arbi-
trary exercise compared to WC and exit rights, as sections 3 and 4 above 
have shown. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented and defended the republican case for WD vis-à-
vis exit rights and workplace regulation. First, it has shown that costless 
exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor 
markets. Second, it has shown that comprehensive workplace regulation 
is neither possible nor desirable. Accordingly, these means may be nec-
essary, yet they are insufficient, to prevent arbitrary interference in the 
workplace. Finally, the paper has shown that WD is neither redundant 
nor unnecessary compared to alternative means, such as litigation and 
unionism. But it has also shown that it is the preferable option from a 
republican standpoint only where managerial authority is exercised, giv-
en that self-employment is a form of labor in which managerial interfer-
ence—and, thus, the possibility of managerial arbitrary interference—is 
absent ex hypothesi. 
                                                 
 
50Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1970), p. 7. 
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 This paper has focused exclusively on the protection of republican 
freedom in the workplace. Since its scope is limited, further research is 
required. A number of additional variables—including the feasibility, 
efficiency, and externalities of democratic firms—should be carefully 
considered if a conclusive case for WD is to be made.51 
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